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Afandamental economic and social principle embedded in the Amer-
ican psyche remains the value of shelter. However, housing policy
is the result of a complex exchange among economic, political, and
social agendas competing for attention within the multiple levels of
local, state, and federal governments. This article intends to capture
what we consider afea of the significant initiatives since 1980 that
reflect these tensions and comprise our current housing policies and
directions. Furthermore, we suggest additional housing issues that
may need to be addressed by the next presidential administration.
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Housing policy is the result of a complex exchange among
economic, political, and social agendas competing for atten-
tion within the multiple levels of local, state, and federal gov-
ernments. Missing in recent history is the commitment for a
"...decent and suitable living environment for every American
family" as specified in the Housing Act of 1949 (Orlebeke, 2000,
p. 489). Instead, current housing policy reflects the dynamic
tensions between a capitalistic economy and the shelter needs
of those in vulnerable economic conditions or those who may
be unable to sustain or afford accommodations.
This article intends to capture what we consider a few of the
significant initiatives since 1980 that reflect these tensions and
comprise our current housing policies and directions. Many of
these programs are the result of legislation and social upheav-
als that occurred prior to the Reagan Administration. Their
impact, however, has had lasting implications and has set the
course for our housing policy today. Therefore, we will begin
with a brief review of key events that shaped the direction of
housing policy prior to the Reagan Administration. (Critiques
of these events are readily available in the literature.) We will
discuss significant housing policies that have emerged since
1980. Finally, we will offer our thoughts on what the housing
policy issues may be for the next presidential administration
beginning in the year 2009.
The Emergence of Housing as a National Goal
A fundamental economic and social principle embedded
in the American psyche remains the value of shelter. This
commodity provides access to assets, goods, self-sustainabil-
ity, and self-esteem (Bratt, 2002). However, obtaining shelter
is not an easy feat. Within the context of this article, we note
that race, gender, socio-economic status, language proficiency,
immigration category, and residency location have been and
continue to act as barriers to obtaining housing and, in particu-
lar, to property ownership. In addition, we acknowledge that
these factors are mitigated by and embedded within larger so-
cietal forces. To discuss the impact of each of these issues is
beyond the scope of this work; however, it is not surprising
that the role of the federal government in interceding to ensure
that shelter is available to all citizens can be traced back to the
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economic conditions of the 1930s (Colton, 2003).
During that decade, several important initiatives were
started that serve as the foundations for current housing policy.
Briefly, these included the National Housing Act of 1934, which
created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and subse-
quent enhanced mortgage insurance options for single family
dwellings and multiple family complexes; the Housing Act of
1937, which sanctioned a public housing program that set limits
on rental rates for low-income individuals and conditions for
administration of such programs; and the 1938 amendments to
the National Housing Act which created Fannie Mae, thereby
establishing a mechanism to provide a consistent stream of
mortgage monies into what is now known as the secondary
housing market.
In tandem with the expanding role of government in the
financing, demolition, rehabilitation, and/or production of
physical housing units, the effects of World War II on the citi-
zens of this country demanded legislative action. In particular,
the housing needs of returning soldiers and their place in the
urban workforce received the most attention (Colton, 2003).
The result was the passage of the Housing Act of 1949, land-
mark legislation which fundamentally redefined the role of
the government with respect to shelter. According to Orlebeke
(2000), this legislation marked the beginning of federal con-
sideration of issues such as "...defining who besides the im-
mediately desperate might receive housing assistance, what
form such assistance might take and for what types of 'decent'
housing, and who should be administratively responsible for
running the system" (p. 480).
In the following decade, federal efforts were focused on
urban renewal and redevelopment efforts. These included pro-
grams to develop nonresidential areas, provision of relocation
monies to those displaced by renewal efforts, and financial in-
centives for acquiring property to proceed with renewal efforts.
In 1959, local housing authorities were given the ability to
assign flexible rents within their properties, allowing access to
dwellings previously unavailable to those of very low income.
However, despite ambitious goals set by various legislations,
housing for low-income households remained in short supply
(Colton, 2003).
By the 1960s, with the explosion of social activism in
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numerous arenas and the returning focus on poverty, renewed
attention to the importance of housing and the conditions
of these properties emerged (Erickson, 2006). In 1965, the
various federal administrative entities which oversaw indi-
vidual segments of housing issues were joined under a new
cabinet level organization, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). Emphasis on housing produc-
tion, federal below-market interest rate financing for private
and nonprofit builders of low-to-moderate income housing,
and rental subsidy programs were implemented as strategies
to address many of the issues raised during these times. In ad-
dition, during this decade, governments' role in housing was
recognized and intrinsically linked by the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. In Title III of this Act, issues of fair housing
practices are addressed "...making it unlawful to refuse to sell,
rent, or make a dwelling unavailable to any person because
of race, color, religion or national origin, or to deny a loan or
other financial assistance for the purchase, construction, repair,
or maintenance of a dwelling" (Colton, 2003, p. 218).
The emphasis on housing policies changed again under
the Nixon administration. Budget issues, media attention to
failing public housing entities and abuses in other HUD pro-
grams, and organizational consolidation of housing programs
helped to create the conditions for a two year moratorium re-
garding housing policy. However, emerging out of this hiatus
was the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.
The legacy of this legislation remains influential in current
housing policy programs. Included in this law was the origi-
nation of a "certificate program" which serves as a basis for the
current Housing Choice Voucher (Section 8) program, the es-
tablishment of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG
funds) to assist local governments with redevelopment efforts,
and the end of government building of public housing (Colton,
2003; Erickson, 2006). Other significant policies during this
decade are the 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),
a policy implemented to address (among other things) the
then common practice of "redlining" by mortgage lenders or
banks, followed by the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), which "encouraged" lenders to serve underserved
communities (Collins, 2007, p. 69). Although President Carter
was a strong advocate for supporting housing developments
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for low-income individuals through self-help neighborhood
established, nonprofit programs (Marcuse, & Keating, 2006),
he failed to recognize the potential for the extreme profitability
for developers in producing specific types of housing stock for
low-income housing in private-public partnerships, a condi-
tion which remains today (Orlebeke, 2000).
In summary, the emergence of housing as an issue associ-
ated with the well-being of a civil and democratic society is
closely linked to the economic and social turmoil in past history.
Within these periods, strategies for addressing housing needs,
particularly for low-income persons, have reflected the prevail-
ing view of the Presidential political party. Perhaps due to this,
approaches to shelter policies reflect a mix of public-private
market incentives (especially for those in the housing industry
and in community redevelopment), favorable tax policies for
certain types of dwellers and dwellings, and a decreased em-
phasis on the housing needs of those unable to sustain partici-
pation in the economy.
The ongoing evolution of housing policy is dependent on
the resolution of the varying approaches to the following policy
questions: 1) Should public entities or the private sector build
housing? 2) Should assistance target suppliers of housing or be
provided directly to tenants? 3) How large should subsidies be
and who should be targeted? and 4) Should programs support
rental options or homeownership?
Support for the Private Market
As Reagan entered office, it was evident that housing issues
had at least two influential lobby groups which those making
policy had to consider. These were the housing industry and
tax policy groups. A signature document reflecting the direc-
tion of housing policy under the Reagan Administration is the
1982 President's Commission on Housing. As a supply-side
conservative, Reagan did not support federal construction pro-
grams for public housing, favored privatizing public housing,
and increasingly cut HUD's budget for new commitments to
housing (Johnson, 1991).
With increased pressure from housing advocates pushing
for support for low-income dwellings, by 1985, the Housing
Choice Voucher (Section 8) certificate program begun in the
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1970s was expanded. In this program, a participant with a cer-
tificate was able seek a place to live in an approved private
market housing dwelling and only pay the difference between
the voucher value and the rental rate. All participants accepted
into this program had to (and continue to) meet certain income
requirements and properties available to certificate holders
must have rents below a specified threshold and be approved
by the local public housing authority.
Clearly, what emerged under this administration was the
reliance on individual income to support housing needs and
the private housing market to supply available units. However,
what was neglected during this time was the construction of
units specifically for those with low-to-modest incomes or
those who were socially and/or economically vulnerable and
could not participate in the workforce. The shortage of afford-
able housing was beginning. Subsequent legislation only exac-
erbated the problem.
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program Operations
(LIHTC Program)
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 dealt a severe blow to the build-
ing of commercial real estate, which includes rental housing
units. Prior to 1986, several tax incentives existed to encourage
the provision of rental housing. Generally, these involved the
opportunity for property owners to claim (for tax purposes)
that a building was depreciating at a faster rate than the actual
economic and physical deterioration of the property and to
deduct this depreciation amount from income earned by the
property in calculating the tax liability for the year.
The accelerating of depreciation deductions for tax pro-
poses resulted in the ability of property owners to claim nega-
tive earnings from a property and reduce their tax bill on other
income. Negative taxable income was allowed by the tax law,
despite the fact that the building, without the depreciation,
generated a positive cash flow. Further, when the building
was sold, net proceeds from the sale were taxed a lower rate
than other income earned by the investor, furthering the tax
advantage of owning rental housing. Preferential treatment for
rental housing investment was ended in 1986. Elimination of
these tax incentives reduced the enticement to invest in rental
housing. In their place, the Tax Reform Act created the Low
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Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. With modi-
fications, the LIHTC program was consistently renewed by
Congress, and Congress legislated permanent status for the
program in 1993.
The LIHTC program has replaced not only prior tax incen-
tives for low income rental housing but other subsidy programs
for low income housing construction as well. For example, the
Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation
program, also known as project based Section 8, was cancelled.
The Section 8 program provided commitments to developers
of affordable housing that rent would be subsidized in their
units and that these payments would be made on units even
if the units were not occupied. Further, the LIHTC program
shifted the trend of federal low income housing policy, which
had been moving toward providing assistance through direct
(or "demand side") subsidies to tenants (i.e., Section 8 vouch-
ers and certificates). Instead, the LIHTC program provides in-
vestor tax incentives (i.e., "supply side" subsidies). But also
note that the program provides no direct subsidy to develop-
ers of affordable housing, only a tax incentive.
The operations of this program can be daunting (McClure,
2000). We will highlight a few of its features. The LIHTC
program provides a "tax credit" rather than an income de-
duction as an incentive for rental housing property owners. A
credit is a direct reduction of taxes owed, rather than an offset
against income prior to calculating taxes. For new construc-
tion and substantial rehabilitation projects, the tax credit is
approximately 9 percent of the development cost of a project
excluding the cost of land, acquisition of an existing property,
projects financed with tax-exempt bonds, or those receiving
below-market rate loans from a federal source.
The tax credit is taken each year for ten years. In return for
receiving the credit, the developer must ensure that the project
continuously satisfies restricted-income criteria for at least 15
years and, after 1989, for 30 years. However, after 15 years the
owners may notify the state administrative agency of their in-
tention to begin renting the units at market determined rates.
Once notified, the state has one year to find a buyer willing to
maintain the restricted income occupancy and pay a price for
the project determined by a statutory formula. If the state does
not find such a buyer and the project is converted to a market-
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rate project, current tenants must be allowed to maintain their
status for a period of three years.
The income and rent restrictions that developer/owners of
tax credit properties must meet are as follows: First, at least 20
percent of the units must be occupied by tenants whose income
is less than 50 percent of the metropolitan area's median family
income, or 40 percent of the units must be occupied by tenants
with income less than 60 percent of the metro area median.
Second, maximum allowable rents on the units against which
the tax credits are claimed are constrained by the level of the
median income in the metropolitan area. More specifical-
ly, allowable rents are capped at what a household with the
maximum qualifying income in the area could afford if it paid
30 percent of its income for rental housing (including tenant
paid utility expenses). For example, if the developer has chosen
to meet the 40%-60% units-income standard, the maximum al-
lowable rent is equal to the amount a household-with income
equal to 60 percent of the area median-would spend on rent if
30 percent of household income is devoted to rent. In practice,
most projects include 100 percent of the units with rents at the
60 percent of median income standard.
It is important to note that allowable rents are not based
on the household income of the tenant(s) occupying the unit.
Rather, they are based on the area's median household income.
Thus, the program does not guarantee that an individual
household will not have to pay more than 30 percent of its
gross income in rental expenses. Instead, the program guaran-
tees that rental expenses will not exceed the level considered
to be affordable by standards within the overall area (McClure,
2000). This is what is referred to as a "shallow subsidy." This
implies that households at the lowest income levels pay
a greater share of their income toward rent. In contrast, the
Section 8 program provides a deep subsidy because the subsidy
is based on tenant income and assures that the tenant pays no
more than 30 percent of income toward housing costs. Further,
the shallow nature of the subsidy is most severe for very low
income households in high median income metropolitan sta-
tistical areas because maximum rents, based on area median
incomes, are highest in those areas.
Additional subsidy from federal, state, or local sources is
often needed for a viable LIHTC project. Many projects require
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substantial amounts of federal and state-funded special financ-
ing, making the burden of administrative compliance substan-
tial for projects using multiple funding sources.
Although the subsidy to investors is provided entirely
through the federal income tax system, LIHTC programs are
administered through state-level government agencies, gener-
ally the state housing finance agency. Developers/inestors
seeking tax credits for their projects must apply to the state
administrative agency. Tax credit bidders are put through a
competitive evaluation process. After a successful bidder is
"allocated" his/her credits, the development or rehabilitation
completed, and the completed project occupied by tenants, the
program begins to grant 4 percent or 9 percent credits against
the property owners' federal income tax liabilities.
As discussed above, because most units are built with rents
near the maximum allowable, the LIHTC program does not
meet the needs of the households with the greatest housing
needs as consistently shown by HUD studies, those with
incomes below 30 percent of area median income. The 60 percent
of median income standard for the LIHTC program translates
into qualifying income exceeding $30,000 in a number of met-
ropolitan areas and approaching $40,000 in some. Households
occupying such units would require additional subsidy assis-
tance such as a Housing Choice Voucher (Section 8) to keep
their expenditures on housing below the 30 percent of income
standard commonly thought to be the maximum that should
be spent on housing.
Homelessness
While major changes were occurring in the areas of tax
reform to support private developers and real-estate initia-
tives during the 1980s, a convergence of social problems led
to the increasingly visible number of homeless individuals
on the streets, especially within urban centers. However, the
presidential response was to cast the issue of homelessness in
terms of the failure of the individual rather than systemic prob-
lems, such as inadequate social services resources to meet the
need of this population or the insufficient supply of affordable
housing or shelters (Marcuse & Keating, 2006). Unfortunately,
this philosophy remains dominant despite numerous schol-
arly reports documenting the struggles of this population and
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the complexity of their service and housing needs (Burt, Aron,
& Lee, 2001; Burt, Hedderson, Zweig, Ortiz, Aron-Turnham, &
Johnson, 2004; Wright, Rubin, & Devine, 1998)
Yet back in 1987, despite unenthusiastic presidential
support, the Democratic Congress was able to push through
what remains to date as the only major legislation focusing on
housing and homelessness-McKinney Homeless Assistance
Act-now known as the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance
Act. Currently, there are nine programs in the Act that describe
a range of services including emergency food and shelter
support, transitional housing programs, guidelines for surplus
land or property use, health care programs, and supportive
work programs (National Coalition for the Homeless, 2006).
However, this legislation was never intended to eradicate the
many underlying causes of homelessness or address the short-
age of affordable housing units. Rather it was and remains a
beginning step to launch targeted efforts to address the con-
tinuing and growing problem of sustained homelessness in the
country. According to the latest Annual Homeless Assessment
Report to Congress, it can be estimated that approximately
313,000 to 415,000 persons are homeless on any given day (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2007a).
The Re-Emergence of Housing in the 1990s
As the last decade of the 2 0 1h century began, the federal gov-
ernment continued to remove itself from the public housing
sphere and to support private-based housing options. The in-
fluence of the 1990 Cranston-Gonzalez Affordable Housing
Act, which established the HOME Investment Partnership
Program, provided various opportunities for low-income
rental tenants in the housing market, including the ability of
public housing residents to use subsidies to rent or purchase
homes on the private market and support services to promote
homeownership as a goal for all households (Carliner, 1998).
Further, the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere
(HOPE VI) program provided for the revitalization of federal-
ly-backed public housing in partnership with private and local
government entities to support the housing needs of a select
group of low-income individuals and families and those of
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moderate incomes. This innovative but controversial program
will be discussed next.
Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere Program
(HOPE VI)
The HOPE VI program was a response to a 1992 report to
Congress by the National Commission on Severely Distressed
Public Housing. In this report, the Commission estimated
that 86,000 of the existing 1.4 million units of public housing
were in severely distressed condition. Their recommendation
was to demolish these units and replace them over a ten-year
period at a cost of $7.5 billion (in 1992 dollars). The program,
administered by HUD, is intended to improve the living en-
vironment for residents of severely distressed public housing,
as well as to contribute to the revitalization of surrounding
neighborhoods (Finkel, Lennon & Eisenstadt, 2000; Popkin,
Katz, Cunningham, Brown, Gustafson, & Turner, 2004a;
Salama, 1999). The program follows a mixed-finance model
where public funds are leveraged by private investment and
nonprofit participation to create new housing opportunities.
HOPE VI developments may include not only public housing
units, but also units funded through other public programs
(such as the LIHTC) and market-rate units funded solely by
private investment. In addition, some HOPE VI developments
include opportunities for homeownership.
Expected residents of these properties included former
public housing residents, those individuals or families partici-
pating in the Housing Choice Vouchers (Section 8) program,
and individuals who would pay market rate for a dwelling.
This program also includes case management and support-
ive services for specific groups of residents, including those
former public housing residents returning to live in the housing
complex.
The mixed-income approach to housing is a fundamen-
tal component of the HOPE VI program. It is based in large
part on the work of sociologist William Julius Wilson. In his
1987, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass,
and Public Policy, Wilson describes an underclass culture exist-
ing in many inner-city neighborhoods. The underclass culture
includes weak labor force participation, high rates of welfare
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receipt, teenage pregnancy, drug use and violent crime. He at-
tributes this phenomenon to the lack of middle- and working-
class residents to serve as role models and the absence of im-
portant institutions within the community, such as schools and
name-brand stores (Epp, 1996; Popkin, Levy, Harris, Comey,
& Cunningham, 2004b; Wilson, 1987). The HOPE VI mixed-
income approach was intended to be a policy remedy for the
conditions that have contributed to the isolation of poor mi-
norities in the inner city.
By early 2007, more than $6.2 billion' in HOPE VI funding
had been allocated, although funding levels experienced
a marked decline in federal fiscal years 2004, 2005 and 2006
when compared with earlier years in the program's history
(U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2007).
The decline in funding is attributable to rising federal budget
deficits and efforts by the current Bush administration to ter-
minate the program.
Belmont Heights Estates in Tampa, Florida, provides a
HOPE VI example. This redevelopment effort began in 1997
with the Tampa Housing Authority's successful application for
$32.5 million in HOPE VI funding. The redeveloped commu-
nity replaced 1,300 units of severely distressed, barracks-style
public housing where only the most impoverished households
lived with 789 units of mixed-income housing in attractive and
varied designs. Also, there were a limited number of specially
designed units to accommodate the needs of older adults or
those with disabilities. Residents of this community included
former public housing tenants from the demolished communi-
ty, Housing Choice Voucher recipients, and others able to afford
market rate rentals. The redevelopment effort also included
opportunities for qualified low-income households to build
their financial knowledge and social and economic capacity to
move toward homeownership to affordable detached homes
in the community (Fogel, Smith & Williamson, in press-a).
This HOPE VI program has been credited with significant
reductions in crime and increased property values in the sur-
rounding Belmont Heights neighborhood. Further, the effort to
mix individuals and families based on incomes has also been
successful (Shimberg Center, 2006). Residents in this com-
munity reported feeling safer, trusting their neighbors, and
an increased appreciation for how their community looks to
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others (Fogel, Smith & Williamson, in press-a). These findings
are similar to other reports evaluating HOPE VI communities,
although generalizing findings from one site to other should
be done cautiously, as each HOPE VI community has unique
characteristics (Fosburg, Popkin & Locke, 1996; Popkin, Levy,
Harris, Comey, Cunningham, Buron, & Woodley, 2002).
HOPE VI has been credited with considerable success.
By mid-2003, 60,580 severely distressed public housing units
had been demolished (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 12).
In many instances, HOPE VI redevelopment efforts replaced
distressed housing with new, high-quality developments rep-
resenting innovations in design, management and financing.
Many former public housing residents have been able to use
Housing Choice Vouchers (Section 8) to relocate to improved
housing in safer areas. Further, HOPE VI redevelopment has
led to wider revitalization efforts in many neighborhoods
surrounding the former sites of distressed public housing.
Improvements in many instances include dramatically reduced
crime rates and the construction of new community centers,
revitalized parks and other community facilities (Fogel, Smith,
& Williamson, in press-a; General Accounting Office, 2003;
Naparstek, Freis, Kingsley, Dooley, & Lewis, 2000; Popkin, et
al., 2004a; Zielenbach, 2002).
Achieving such successes has not, however, been without
its challenges. HOPE VI implementation has generated concern
about the impact of relocation on original residents, decreasing
numbers of deeply subsidized housing units and the failure of
some housing authorities to effectively implement the program
(Clampet-Lundquist, 2004; General Accounting Office, 2003;
Popkin, et al., 2004a; Popkin, et al., 2004b). Many relocated
residents were simply moved to other public housing devel-
opments; thus, relocation has done little, if anything, to reduce
the concentration of poverty or racial segregation they expe-
rience. Those who are hard-to-house due to mental illness,
physical disabilities, large families, or being custodial grand-
parents may be especially likely to relocate and stay at their
temporary housing site rather than moving to the new HOPE
VI community (General Accounting Office, 2003; Popkin, et
al., 2004a). Therefore, as access to HOPE VI property dimin-
ishes for some, the concentration of poverty and households
with various problems increases at remaining public housing
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developments in the area (Clampet-Lindquist, 2004).
Another problem is arises for some who have relocated
using vouchers. For instance, former residents may face higher
housing costs due to paying utilities on the private market,
as well as problems finding landlords willing to accept the
voucher. They may also find it difficult to use the vouchers in
areas where an adequate supply of moderately priced rental
housing is not available (General Accounting Office, 2003;
Popkin, et al., 2004a).
Further, while HOPE VI implementation has demolished a
substantial proportion of the 86,000 severely distressed public
housing units identified in the Commission's 1992 report and
is responsible for the construction of a large number of afford-
able rental units, the majority of the new units are not deeply
subsidized (as are public housing units). In results reported
for mid-2003, the General Accounting Office indicated that less
than one-third of the 60,580 of the demolished public housing
units had been replaced with new public housing units. Other
HOPE VI units were either provided with shallow subsidies
(such as the LIHTC, which sets tenant rents based on area
median incomes rather than actual tenant incomes) or at market
rates. Therefore, the number of units affordable to households
below the federal poverty level has been significantly de-
creased by the HOPE VI program (General Accounting Office,
2003; Schwartz, 2006).
Finally, although many housing authorities have been suc-
cessful in redeveloping demolished public housing within
a reasonable period of time, others have been plagued with
delays associated with local political controversies, litigation
and inefficient timelines for the expenditure of HOPE VI funds
(Popkin, et al., 2004a). Delays in redeveloping some HOPE
VI sites have opened the program to criticism about lack of
program effectiveness.
Despite concerns raised by tenant relocation issues and
ineffective implementation on the part of some housing au-
thorities, HOPE VI has widespread support among housing
policy experts. Among its other positive impacts, HOPE VI has
been described as changing public perceptions about public
housing and its desirability. Further, it has engaged private-
sector investors and state and local governments in the pro-
duction and operation of public housing, thereby permanently
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transforming housing policy directed towards the poorest
households from public provisions of housing-of-last-resort
into a public-private collaborative effort designed to build suc-
cessful, revitalized communities.
Homeownership
Also in the 1990s, housing policy shifted to an emphasis
on homeownership for low- and moderate-income house-
holds, as several initiatives at the Federal, state, and local
levels have promoted homeownership, including opportuni-
ties for HOPE VI residents. Among the homeownership initia-
tives were the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (now
NeighborWorks America), Campaign for Homeownership,
President Clinton's National Homeownership Strategy and a
trillion dollar commitment by Fannie Mae. In 2002, the current
Bush administration reiterated the goal of securing homeown-
ership for Americans, particularly for minority individuals
with an ambitious plan to raise homeownership levels for this
group by 5.5 million (Marcuse & Keating, 2006). Furthermore,
financial institutions have expanded their commitment to
lending to low-income and minority households, in part
because of the lending test required by the 1977 CRA legis-
lation. The Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and
Soundness Act impacts the government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) in the secondary mortgage market (Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac) by allowing HUD to set affordable housing goals
(see Wyly, Cooke, Hammel, Holloway & Hudson, 2001 for a list
of these and other initiatives in support of homeownership).
These efforts reflect the growing literature supporting the
benefits of homeownership in household stability, children's
success, and community participation. (Boehm & Schottmann,
2002; Bratt, 2002; Green & White, 1997; Harkness & Newman,
2002; Haurin, Parcel, & Haurin, 2002; Rohe, Van Zandt, &
McCarthy, 2002; Rohe & Stewart, 1996; Sykes, 2005). In ad-
dition, these efforts are a response to low homeownership
rates for African-American, Hispanic, and other low income
households that have lagged behind those of non-Hispanic
white households. At the core of homeownership initia-
tives are public-private partnerships with nonprofit housing
and community based organizations, such as Community
Development Corporations (CDCs) as key participants, and
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the establishment of homebuyer training programs that target
underserved potential homebuyers. While the importance of
homebuyer training programs is acknowledged, only recently
has research examined the components of homebuyer train-
ing programs that help to prevent default and foreclosure
(Fogel, Smith, & Williamson, in-press-b; Hirad & Zorn, 2002;
McCarthy, Van Zandt, & Rohe, 2001; Quercia & Wachter, 1996).
An outcome of these efforts is that significant portions of the
rental household population of generations past are convert-
ing to homeownership.
However, despite these significant efforts, critiques of the
Clinton administration note that the number of affordable
housing units available to low to moderate income individuals
dramatically dropped due to a combination of several factors.
These include the conversion of previously subsidized rental
units available to Housing Choice Voucher (Section 8) holders
to market-rate rental housing, the decline in the stock of exist-
ing housing units, and the decrease in building of new units
for these tenants (Bratt, 2003).
The Turn of the 21s' Century
Despite the success of initiatives in the 1990s (Belsky
& Duda, 2002), the gap in homeownership rates remains.
In response, President Bush announced in June, 2002 a goal
of closing the homeownership gap for minority house-
holds by 5.5 million households by the end of the decade
(see http: //www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeownership /
20031216p2.html). Paralleling the Federal efforts, a number
of states and local governments have created trust funds
and other mechanisms to increase homeownership. Using
Federal and local resources, local governments and nonprofit
housing organizations working in cooperation with lending
institutions and the real estate community have endeavored
to expand homeownership largely through front-end pro-
grams such as homebuyer training programs, downpayment
assistance, second mortgage loans, housing rehabilitation, and
first mortgages that aid families in getting into a home. The
evidence suggests that these programs have been successful in
increasing the homeownership rate of low-income and minor-
ity households.2
Housing Policy Initiatives 191
The sustainability of homeownership has become a recent
and significant policy concern. The rise of defaults and fore-
closures within the middle class and other relatively stable
economic markets has generated national interest in the re-
lationship between the housing industry and the subprime
market.' Default and foreclosure are generally the end result
of the failure to sustain homeownership, although households
may also sell their home to end their homeownership status.
Much of the literature on default and foreclosure addresses
factors related to personal financial situation, characteristics
of the property, or terms of the loan. (See Baku & Smith, 1998
for a summary of the literature.) While circumstances such as
loss of job, unexpected illness, and divorce may be unavoid-
able, other risks may be reduced through increased training
in financial literacy, mortgage option choice, choosing a home,
home maintenance, and other relevant topics.
While homeownership remains a stated priority for the
current Bush administration, critics argue that significant
housing concerns remain unaddressed and unfunded. Issues
of housing affordability remain a serious concern, as do
other specialized housing needs for target populations (such
as Native Americans, homeless, and immigrants) and needs
of specific regions in the county (Marcuse & Keating, 2006).
According to the 2006 State of the Nation's Housing, in the
three years from 2001-2004, 15.6 million low-to middle-income
households were paying more than half of their incomes
for housing, representing a severe cost burden. Further, it is
estimated that in 2004, 49% of working poor families with chil-
dren had severe cost burdens, with 75% experiencing moder-
ate burdens. For those that are classified as the near-working
poor, 17% had severe burdens; with an astounding 52% ex-
perience moderate burdens (see http://www.jchs.harvard.
edu/publications/markets/son2006 / index.htm). Despite or-
ganized lobbying efforts from diverse constituents, the estab-
lishment of a National Housing Trust Fund, which would have
provided dedicated, on-going financial resources to support
efforts to acquire and preserve 1.5 million housing units for
the lowest low-income families over the next 10 years, was not
supported by the Bush administration. Reasons given for this
decision include suggesting that this program duplicates the
efforts of the HOME program, will impact funding allocations
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of current housing programs, may jeopardize the financial sta-
bility of established governmental insurance funds and may
be vulnerable to the influences of political pressures, thereby
reducing its intended purposed to serve low-income families
(National Housing Trust Fund, 2007). Additional attempts to
improve funding for HUD failed; housing issues remain a ne-
glected policy area.
Future Issues
At the time of this writing, housing issues are at the fore-
front of news coverage. Declining home values and a severe
downturn in housing construction and sales after a rapid es-
calation through the beginning of the current decade, a crisis
in foreclosures resulting from predatory lending practices and
mortgages that overextended borrowers, and the continuing
loss of affordable rental units from both the assisted housing in-
ventory and the private rental stock are among factors making
finding and sustaining occupancy in suitable housing increas-
ingly difficult for low and moderate income households. As
Gabriel (1996) predicted, the decrease in the number of rental
dwellings as well as decreased income supports to those least
able to afford housing has led to increased economic difficul-
ties from those in the lowest income brackets. With this, an
awareness of the approaching crisis with regards to housing
policy has occurred. However, housing policy issues remain
surprisingly absent from current presidential debates. Likely
areas in which policy initiatives might need to arise are in efforts
to assist households facing foreclosure to sustain homeowner-
ship, increased income support to tenants, reexamination of
the appropriateness of homeownership for all households, and
continuing efforts to preserve the already existing subsidized
housing stock. However, we predict that marginalized and
vulnerable populations will continue to have to struggle to get
their housing needs met.
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(Endnotes)
1) This figure has not been adjusted for inflation over the period of
the program's history.
2) Bostic and Surette (2000) find that from 1989 to 1998 homeown-
ership rates for the lowest and second lowest income quintiles in-
creased by one and three percent, respectively, and attribute these
increases to federal policy initiatives.
3) An excellent overview of the subprime market and foreclosure
issues can be found at the following websites: http://www.feder-
alreserv.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner2007ll05a.htm, http: //
www.treas.gov/pres/releases/hp612.htm, or at http://www.
nw.org/network/neighborworksprogs/ foreclosuresolutions/
reports.asp.
